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Introduction 
 
 
Eurasian Economic Union Integrates 
Energy Markets – EU Stands Aside 
Maria Pastukhova and Kirsten Westphal 
The process of establishing a common energy market in the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) is moving forward after Russia and Belarus succeeded in resolving important 
differences. This reorganisation of the energy space will also affect the European Union, 
because Russia and Kazakhstan are major oil and gas suppliers, and important export 
pipelines originate there. At the same time regulatory and technical fault lines are 
becoming apparent between the EU/European Energy Community and the EAWU – also 
affecting transnational physical infrastructure. Furthermore, the integration blocs 
overlap in sensitive regions like the Caucasus, the Black Sea region and the Baltic states. 
 
The EU remains sceptical towards the Eura-
sian Economic Union (EAEU), which was 
founded in early 2015 by Russia, Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The 
EAEU has ambitious energy policy goals: 
a common electricity market by 2019, a 
common oil market by 2024 and a gas 
market by 2025. 
The EAEU’s integration process is driven 
by more than just Russia’s geostrategic inter-
est in consolidating its own sphere of influ-
ence. It also offers its members a survival 
strategy for economic systems still heavily 
shaped by their Soviet heritage and value 
chains. One concrete indication that the 
EAEU is more than just a Moscow-driven 
project is the consensus principle for deci-
sions in the EAEU’s highest supranational 
organ, the Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council, and in its most important over-
sight body, the Council of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. Decisions in the 
Board of the Eurasian Economic Commis-
sion, are by consensus or two-thirds major-
ity, with each member state supplying 
two representatives regardless of size and 
economic strength. 
Energy Market: Progress since 2015 
Under the Treaty establishing the EAEU in 
2015, cooperation and integration in the 
field of energy is one of its main objectives. 
Energy market concepts for the three prin-
cipal energy sectors– electricity, oil and gas 
– were drafted by the Board in 2015 
(see SWP Comment 9/2016) and adopted by 
the Supreme Economic Council in spring 
2016. Based on these concepts, individual 
programmes for electricity, oil and gas will 
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define timeframes and lay out fundamental 
principles for cooperation. Ultimately the 
programmes will serve as the basis for the 
national development plans of the individ-
ual EAEU member states. In recent months 
the EAEU has made progress on formulating 
the programmes, even if implementation 
will require time for coordinating and im-
plementing standards, norms and processes. 
The Council of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission adopted the programme for 
the development of a common electricity 
market on 30 November 2016. It was able 
to move fastest on electricity, where the dis-
cussions are less politically sensitive and 
existing trading platforms can be used to 
create a common market. Although a con-
crete pricing mechanism has yet to be 
finalised, it is already clear that the pro-
posed energy exchanges will function under 
common rules. Since the EAEU was estab-
lished, cross-border electricity trading has 
grown by 24 percent to 7.61 terawatt hours 
per annum. Overcapacity – with total in-
stalled capacity in the member states 
exceeding 282.8 gigawatts – and moderni-
sation requirements generate extensive 
potential for synergies. 
The Board of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission approved the programme 
for a common oil market on 12 September 
2017. It passed the Council on 20 Decem-
ber 2017 but has yet to be signed by the 
heads of state. The programme will abolish 
state regulation of oil pricing within the 
EAEU and create a common market ex-
change by 2021, as well as guaranteeing 
non-discriminatory access to transport 
pipelines. 
The common oil market will be coordi-
nated with the EAEU’s transport and infra-
structure policy. Implications for infra-
structure projects must be anticipated not 
only within the EAEU member states, but 
also for transport links to third countries. 
Tariffs for transport of crude oil between 
EAEU states, for transit of crude and for 
resale of crude and petroleum products to 
third countries are to be harmonised, and 
infrastructure projects will be coordinated 
at EAEU level. This arrangement will on the 
one hand grant the oil-producing members 
(Kazakhstan and above all Russia) greater 
leverage over Belarus, as Minsk will be losing 
its ability to make unilateral decisions on 
tariffs and transport for its (re-)exports of 
crude and petroleum products. On the other 
hand, the EAEU’s position in Eurasia will be 
strengthened, because new oil-related infra-
structure projects “of mutual interest” will 
no longer be realised unilaterally or bi-
laterally but agreed and implemented 
multilaterally at the level of the Economic 
Union. This could for example force China 
to develop the Eurasian infrastructure ele-
ments of its Belt and Road initiative in co-
operation with the EAEU, rather than bi-
laterally with individual countries as it 
has to date. Especially for the Central Asian 
countries, the EAEU clearly represents an 
important component of a multivectoral-
ism designed to avoid becoming subsumed 
entirely into China’s sphere of influence. 
The EAEU is also discussing harmoni-
sation of energy statistics, a shared data-
gathering system and common quality 
standards. Committees are already working 
to list measures required to regulate inte-
grated oil and gas markets, such as inclu-
sive auction processes, access to transport 
systems, and trade mechanisms for oil and 
gas. Even if these programmes are tailored 
to the internal markets, the emergence of 
EAEU-wide energy markets could also im-
pact external relations. However, all the 
programmes are as yet very vague, and 
still need to be translated into technical 
norms, regulatory standards and legal pro-
visions. 
Integrated Gas Market: 
Biggest Hurdle Already Cleared 
The concept for the EAEU gas market was 
approved in spring 2016 at the same time 
as the oil concept. But the negotiations over 
this integrated market were subsequently 
stalemated for a considerable period, above 
all on account of Russian-Belarusian energy 
dispute (see SWP Comment 15/2017). 
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In early 2016, at a point where gas prices 
were falling in the EU, Minsk declared that 
it was paying too much for Russian gas. In 
2016 Belarus unilaterally cut the price it 
paid Gazprom from the agreed $132 per 
thousand cubic metres to just $73, and as a 
result accrued debts to Gazprom exceeding 
$720 million. Russia responded by cutting 
oil exports to Belarus, dealing a grave blow 
to the latter’s oil-dependent economy. 
In April 2017 Presidents Vladimir Putin 
and Alexander Lukashenka reached a com-
promise under which Belarus will receive 
Russian gas for three years at prices lower 
than that of 2016 ($130 per thousand cubic 
metres for 2017, $129 for 2018 and $127 for 
2019). The price formula will remain based 
on the price of gas in the Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug in northern Russia. On 
13 April 2017 Belarus paid Gazprom $726.2 
million owed for Russian gas supplies in 
2016/2017. The use of gas pipelines and 
other infrastructure will in future be gov-
erned by EAEU rules for access to the ser-
vices of natural monopolies and Russia will 
increase its duty-free oil exports to Belarus 
from 18 million to 24 million tonnes an-
nually until 2024. While 18 million tonnes 
ensure that Belarusian oil refineries can 
operate at full capacity, the other 6 million 
can be exported directly with the export 
duties accruing to the Belarusian state 
budget. One important condition attached 
to the agreement is that the two sides agree 
a “sustainable programme for a common 
gas market in the EAEU” by the end of 2018. 
This agreement demonstrates Russia’s 
enormous influence on its neighbour’s en-
ergy policy, on account of the Belarusian 
economy’s dependency on refining and 
processing Russian oil and on supplies of 
Russian natural gas. But the agreement also 
removes the most important obstacle on 
the road to a common energy market. The 
April 2017 accord ensures, firstly, that – as 
long as the pricing mechanisms of a com-
mon EAEU gas market cannot be applied 
(probably until 2024) – gas prices for Bela-
rus can be calculated using a formula that 
is more or less acceptable to both sides. As 
such, Belarus has postponed its wish for a 
netback pricing formula until the creation 
of a common gas market. Secondly, the 
EAEU standards agreed to date (in other 
words rules for access to the services of 
natural monopolies) are at least partially 
applied to the bilateral gas trade. 
Further Progress in the Gas Market 
The deal between Moscow and Minsk put 
the integrated gas market back on the 
agenda. The Eurasian Economic Commis-
sion’s advisory committee for oil and gas 
approved the programme for such a mar-
ket on 24 April 2017, and the Board adopted 
it on 12 September 2017. Unlike the pro-
gramme for the integrated oil market, 
which provides for common tariffs and 
mechanisms for transit and export to third 
countries, the programme for the integrated 
natural gas market applies exclusively to 
extraction, trading, transport, storage and 
processing within the EAEU. 
Another objective is to ensure non-dis-
criminatory access to transport services of 
natural monopolies (meaning gas pipelines 
and related infrastructure) for the partici-
pants in the integrated gas market. Along-
side harmonisation of norms and standards 
in the integrated market, control mecha-
nisms are also to be developed to avoid the 
EAEU’s internal tariffs applying to its ex-
ternal trade: these will include preventing 
resale to third countries of gas purchased 
for domestic consumption within the 
EAEU. That will preserve Gazprom’s mo-
nopoly on pipeline exports. 
The regulatory and institutional frame-
work for a liberalised gas market in the 
EAEU has yet to be developed. The pro-
gramme proposes a dual pricing mecha-
nism for transnational gas trading in the 
EAEU. The price of gas traded under bi-
lateral agreements will remain subject to 
state regulation, while market pricing will 
be facilitated for the rest (both long-term 
contracts and exchange trading). There is 
also a long-term objective of developing a 
pricing mechanism that ensures identical 
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margins across the EAEU, but this will prob-
ably have to await the agreement of a treaty 
establishing a common gas market. 
The volume of gas traded within the 
EAEU is comparatively small, with 33.5 bil-
lion cubic metres per annum as against 
177.4 billion cubic metres exported to third 
countries. But the volumes traded at the 
Russian platform Spimex (St Petersburg 
International Mercantile Exchange) are 
growing steadily: from 0.5 billion cubic 
metres in 2014 to an estimated 21 billion 
cubic metres in 2017. There is good reason 
to believe that the Russian exchange will 
slowly establish itself at least as a price 
marker if not as the central trading place. 
Of course, in the first place the pro-
gramme reflects the interests of Russia as 
the EAEU’s biggest gas exporter. The new 
control mechanisms would grant Moscow 
another instrument to prevent, for example, 
gas supplied to Belarus or Kazakhstan being 
sold on to Europe or China. On the other 
hand, the gas-importing member states 
retain the right to receive cheap supplies 
from Russia under bilateral agreements, 
so a balance of interests is obtained. 
Expanding External Relations 
Both the energy market concepts and the 
existing agreements suggest that the har-
monisation of norms and rules, the stand-
ardisation of pricing mechanisms and the 
codification of standards and data all relate 
initially only to energy trading within the 
EAEU. But the EAEU is also working on its 
external relations. In Asia it has encoun-
tered interest both among individual states 
– including India, Mongolia, Singapore and 
Vietnam – and from international organisa-
tions seeking economic cooperation with 
the EAEU and participation (also financial) 
in its integration processes. 
China naturally plays an outstanding 
role, and the EAEU heads of state lost no 
time initiating talks with Beijing in 2015. 
China is the second-largest trading partner 
for the EAEU, which regards it as a strategic 
economic partner in the Asia Pacific region. 
Both Beijing and the EAEU members are 
very interested in bringing the EAEU to-
gether with the Chinese Belt and Road ini-
tiative. Both sides regard the two projects 
as complementary. Talks over an agreement 
on trade and economic cooperation between 
the EAEU and China began in June 2016. 
Since October 2017 the Eurasian Economic 
Commission has been preparing an agree-
ment in cooperation with business repre-
sentatives. 
Cooperation with China is sought not 
only at the level of trade relations, but also 
in the development of a common transport 
and energy space. In March 2017 the Eura-
sian Economic Commission identified a list 
of infrastructure projects supporting the 
Belt and Road initiative to be conducted in 
the scope of the EAEU. Thirty-nine of them 
fall within the category of transport (for 
example modernising existing routes or de-
veloping logistics and transport hubs). The 
proposed web of Eurasian infrastructure 
also comprises energy projects, including 
another gas pipeline to China: the Beineu-
Bozoi-Shymkent Gas Pipeline, through 
which the first five billion cubic metres of 
Kazakh gas flowed in autumn 2016. Funded 
jointly by KazTransGas (Kazakhstan) and 
the Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company Limited 
(China), its capacity is to be expanded to 
15 billion cubic metres annually. The pos-
sibility of using it to transit Russian gas 
to China has also been discussed. All this 
shows that Eurasian interconnectivity is 
being pushed by the EAEU and naturally – 
in the scope of the Belt and Road initiative 
– especially also by China. 
EU Stands Aside 
Beyond the EU, energy spaces are experi-
encing restructuring. As yet Brussels has 
made no official contact with the EAEU, 
despite the latter’s great interest in co-
operation. Political spokespersons of the 
EAEU, as well as representatives at working 
level have consistently expressed the wish 
for exchange with the EU on “best practices” 
in the areas of energy and transport. The 
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EAEU regards dialogue with Brussels as 
logical and objectively overdue: it views the 
“European vector” as an external economic 
priority, and seeks closer cooperation with 
the EU in particular in the areas of tech-
nology, energy efficiency and Industry 4.0. 
Moreover, dialogue between EU and EAEU 
is seen as vital for economic cooperation 
in Europe. 
The reasons why the EU remains on the 
sidelines include scepticism about whether 
the EAEU project will really materialise. Here 
Brussels is ignoring both the most recent 
developments within the EAEU, which is 
continuing to deepen despite political 
differences between its members (see SWP 
Comment 9/2016), as well as the growing 
economic confluence between the EAEU 
and countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
One reason for the EU’s reticence will cer-
tainly be the EAEU’s strategic importance 
for Russia and its consequent geopolitical 
relevance. For Moscow the EAEU is one 
element of the balance of power in a multi-
polar world, creating a counterweight to 
both China’s Belt and Road initiative and to 
the European Union. But in restricting its 
vision to geopolitics and security, the EU is 
ignoring the EAEU’s potential to generate 
progress on market liberalisation and diver-
sification. 
The energy space joining Europe and 
Asia is increasingly being shaped by actors 
other than the EU (see SWP Research Paper 
4/2017). China’s Belt and Road strategy, 
which is successively bringing in individual 
EU member states through moves like the 
16+1 initiative, is the most prominent 
example. In general terms, it is energy in-
frastructures and interconnectivity that 
create and shape integrated energy spaces. 
If diverging legal and regulatory spaces 
now emerge, new fault lines, barriers and 
fractures will appear where they meet, with 
repercussions for commercial activity and 
market transactions. Ostensibly technical 
and commercial processes have potentially 
major political effects; they can disrupt the 
operation of infrastructures, deepen divides 
and exacerbate geopolitical conflicts. 
The EU’s activities to date have concen-
trated on the European Energy Community, 
which includes the states of the Western 
Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. 
The Energy Community seeks to establish 
a stable regulatory framework and reliable 
market mechanisms by gradually introduc-
ing key elements of the EU’s acquis commu-
nautaire in the area of energy. Alongside a 
fundamental overhaul of national laws and 
regulations, this presupposes deep struc-
tural reforms. Turkey and Armenia already 
possess observer status in the Energy Com-
munity; Belarus has applied. While Brussels 
is working towards a common market en-
compassing the EU and the Energy Com-
munity, at the boundaries divides are deep-
ening. But neither the geopolitical nor the 
(geo-)economic repercussions of the emer-
gence of increasingly distinct energy blocs 
can lie in the interests of the EU. A whole 
series of concrete and fundamental argu-
ments thus mitigate in favour of dialogue 
with the EAEU. 
Ten Reasons for Strategic Dialogue 
1) Avoiding regulatory barriers. It should be 
in European’s interest to avoid regulatory 
barriers within its broader region. Ultimately 
the region stretching from western Siberia 
and Central Asia all the way west to Lisbon 
is interconnected by pan-European energy 
corridors and transnational oil, gas and 
electricity networks. In the interests of 
ensuring security of supply it is crucial for 
cross-border infrastructure and energy trad-
ing to function without a hitch. 
2) Compatibility and the free-market model. 
If European businesses are to enjoy market 
opportunities, it is central that the norms, 
standards and rules of the EAEU be compat-
ible with the EU mechanisms. Otherwise the 
EU risks ending up in the role of “rule-taker”. 
Being forced into adapting to standards 
“from the east” could prove a costly business. 
In view of the crisis of free-market trade 
and the rise of China’s mercantilist trade 
model (on which its Belt and Road strategy 
is based) the EAEU acquires more than an 
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important bridging function. As an impor-
tant energy-producing region it also plays 
a key role in constructing a (globally) liber-
alised energy market. 
3) Maximising the geographical scope of mar-
kets. The EU’s reticence is also surprising in 
view of the history of European integration 
and the EU’s “integrative DNA”. In the 1990s, 
the EU was working to establish and expand 
relations with other integration formations. 
Yet even then, bilateralism predominated 
towards former members of the Soviet-led 
Comecon. Today the EU is concentrating 
on consolidating its own energy market, 
rather than pursuing the objective of ex-
panding the market space. This underlying 
pattern is amplified by mistrust towards 
Russia and its plans. But dismissing the 
EAEU as Moscow’s project would mean yet 
again viewing the region solely through a 
geopolitical lens. This risks driving market 
segmentation and wasting strategic ad-
vantages. 
New markets are in fact at stake, but also 
adaptation to the new realities of a multi-
polar world. The EU can only profit from a 
multivectoralism that relativises China’s 
influence (and Russia’s). Some members of 
the EU and Energy Community share such 
an interest in diversifying economic rela-
tions with the members of the EAEU – in 
particular those that experienced bloc alle-
giances in the past and hoped they had left 
these behind them. 
These abstract reasons would suggest 
that the EU should follow and support the 
EAEU’s energy market processes at the tech-
nical, operational and regulatory levels. 
Compartmentalisation of energy questions 
is advisable and expedient because the EU is 
pushing ahead with its own internal Energy 
Union, because Brussels already has an in-
strument at hand in the Energy Community, 
and because steps have thus already been 
undertaken to shape the own external rela-
tions. With such an approach it will also 
be possible to find answers to the concrete 
problems outlined in the following: 
4) Gas transit through Ukraine. Disputes 
about operating arrangements for cross-
border export pipelines have repeatedly 
generated public concern. With regard to 
Russian-Ukrainian relations, discord of a 
regulatory nature could recur in 2018/2019, 
given that the transit agreement between 
Russian and Ukraine expires in 2019. As a 
member of the Energy Community, Ukraine 
will have to ensure that the new transit 
regime conforms to the rules of the Energy 
Community and the EU’s Single Market. 
Legal and regulatory questions will need to 
be clarified, including that of an independ-
ent operator for the transmission system 
(the transit pipeline). So interoperability and 
transparency pose great challenges. Firstly, 
the region’s gas network is still shaped 
by the legacy of the Soviet Union. Secondly, 
regulatory disruptions that could inflame 
the security conflict between Moscow and 
Kiev need to be avoided. Thirdly, gas exports 
via Ukraine should be maintained – presup-
posing legal, technical and economic steps 
supported by all parties and “gas neigh-
bours”. This situation bears risks of spill-
over into the broader security conflict. 
5) Operation of export pipelines. The rules, 
norms and standards developed for trans-
port networks and their operation in the 
EAEU are also significant in relation to 
other export pipelines. At the very least, 
the rules will affect upstream pipelines and 
interconnectors within the EAEU that link 
into export pipelines of the EAEU countries. 
Article 7 of the EAEU Treaty also offers a 
degree of leeway for external relations. 
Thus, these are important course-defining 
decisions for the EU as well. 
6) Desynchronising from BRELL. Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania are still connected to 
the Soviet-era BRELL ring, with otherwise 
only an HVDC connection to the Scandina-
vian Nord Pool electricity market. In spring 
2017 it was decided to synchronise the Bal-
tic states with the European ENTSO-E net-
work by 2025, via Poland. This “BRELLxit” 
will have considerable economic repercus-
sions for both sides, the Baltic states and 
Russia/Belarus. The latter have started in-
vesting in new transmission lines and ex-
pressing claims for compensation. Issues 
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that will have to be accommodated include 
the Belarussian nuclear power plant under 
construction at Ostrovets, which was in-
tended to supply electricity to the EU; nu-
clear safety issues are also at stake. Another 
big question mark is Kaliningrad. It remains 
unclear whether the exclave will be sup-
plied (asynchronously) and/or operated in 
isolation or connected to Russia by some 
other means. Particular vulnerabilities 
could also arise in the transition phase, if 
processes are not closely coordinated among 
the affected parties and a desynchronisa-
tion is realised unilaterally. Given that the 
EAEU intends to realise a common elec-
tricity market by 2019 it represents an 
obvious and central partner. 
7) Synchronisation of Ukraine. At the end 
of June 2017 the Ukrainian transmission 
system operator UKRENERGO concluded an 
agreement with the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Elec-
tricity, ENTSO-E, as the first step towards 
integrating and synchronising Ukrainian’s 
electricity grid with the EU’s. Here again, 
even if synchronisation is a long-term affair 
(in the case of Turkey it took about ten 
years), the problem of emerging technical 
and regulatory barriers at the borders with 
the post- Soviet UPS/IPS system should be 
addressed at an early stage, in order to 
avoid cementing military fronts and de 
facto borders in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. 
8) Synchronisation and neighbouring coun-
tries. The economic repercussions of (de-)syn-
chronisation processes on neighbouring 
countries need to be taken seriously. The 
potential downsides are illustrated by the 
example of Turkey and Georgia. When Tur-
key synchronised with the ENTSO-E net-
work, Georgian investments made under 
the expectation of export opportunities to 
Turkey became unprofitable. The costs were 
then reallocated to the Georgian popula-
tion. 
9) Risky overlaps. Overlaps between the 
EU/Energy Community and EAEU exist in 
regions where “frozen conflicts” smoulder. 
Georgia is a member of the Energy Com-
munity, while Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Armenia are drawn into the orbit of the 
EAEU. Yet in pursuit of multivectoralism 
Armenia is also seeking ties with the EU; 
Belarus is a member of the EAEU, but has 
also requested observer status in the Energy 
Community. The EU needs to find answers 
to these countries’ desires for balance be-
tween power blocs. That again speaks for 
dialogue between Brussels and the EAEU. 
10) Climate and transformation agenda. 
Dialogue and exchange would be especially 
useful in relation to global climate pro-
tection. Here the EU could engage with 
existing plans: energy-efficient technologies 
are increasingly important to the EAEU. 
The interest in exchange on “best and worst 
practices” in the areas of renewables and 
energy efficiency is remarkable. Since 2016 
the Energy Department of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission has been discussing 
questions relating to corresponding (and 
harmonised) legislation and the introduc-
tion of energy-efficient technologies espe-
cially in the area of energy infrastructure. 
Thus for example the oil market programme 
names the development and enforcement 
of environmental protections as a joint 
responsibility. At the moment Kazakhstan 
is the only member of the EAEU with an 
emissions trading system. 
Conclusions 
It is hard to see why the EU should sideline 
itself from the emerging energy markets of 
the EAEU. Interoperability and transparen-
cy are increasingly important, not only for 
the old physical networks but also in con-
nection with the growing application of 
information and communication technolo-
gies (see SWP Research Paper 4/2017). If the 
EU wishes to avoid ceding the initiative to 
actors like Russia and China, and wants in-
stead to exploit its strategic advantages as 
an integration space, it should gradually 
seek dialogue at the technical and regu-
latory level with representatives of the EAEU. 
In the event that this cannot immediately 
be transposed to the political level, an EU-
EAEU advisory forum could be established, 
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to include representatives of the European 
network operators (ENTSO-E and ENTSOG) 
and regulators (ACER), but also of the Energy 
Community. In any case dangerous rivalry 
over integration in the strategic field of 
energy needs to be avoided. Instead con-
vergence of market areas should be pur-
sued, in order to open up opportunities for 
political and economic liberalisation and 
diversification. 
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